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ABSTRACT 15 
 Reciprocity is probably the most debated of the evolutionary explanations for 16 
cooperation. Part of the confusion surrounding this debate stems from a failure to note 17 
that two different processes can underlie reciprocity: partner control and partner 18 
choice. We suggest that the common observation that group-living animals direct their 19 
cooperative behaviours preferentially to those individuals from which they receive 20 
most cooperation is to be interpreted as the result of the sum of the two separate 21 
processes of partner control and partner choice. We review evidence that partner 22 
choice is the prevalent process in primates and propose explanations for this pattern. 23 
 2 
We make predictions that highlight the need for studies that separate the effects of 24 
partner control and partner choice in a broader variety of group-living taxa. 25 
 26 
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I. INTRODUCTION 46 
 In the endless debate about reciprocity, an aspect that is often neglected is the 47 
need to distinguish between the two different processes that can underlie reciprocal 48 
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exchanges of cooperative behaviours (Noë & Voelkl, 2013). The first study to 49 
distinguish these two processes was probably Bull & Rice (1991; see Eshel & Cavalli-50 
Sforza, 1982 for an earlier insight), that named them 'partner fidelity' (later called 51 
'partner control' by Noë, 2006) and 'partner choice'. In partner-control models (e.g. 52 
Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) dyads of interacting individuals are conceptually isolated 53 
from other dyads and the behaviour of each subject depends only on the previous 54 
behaviour of the partner. As there is no possibility of switching partner, individuals 55 
must try to control the behaviour of the partner by rewarding cooperation and 56 
sanctioning uncooperative behaviour. In partner-choice models (e.g. Campennì & 57 
Schino, 2014) individuals choose their partners on the basis of the benefits they offer, 58 
and the need to sanction uncooperative partners is replaced by partner switching and 59 
outbidding competition. Partner choice features pre-eminently in biological market 60 
models, and proponents of biological market theory have repeatedly emphasized the 61 
distinctiveness of the two processes (Noë & Hammerstein, 1994, 1995; Noë, 2006). 62 
Empirical tests of biological market theory have however tended to focus on market 63 
effects, rather than on distinguishing and separating the effects of partner control and 64 
partner choice (e.g. Henzi & Barrett, 2002; Fruteau et al., 2009). 65 
 In our opinion, the failure to distinguish and separate the two processes of 66 
partner control and partner choice has hampered empirical research and biased 67 
recognition of the presence of reciprocity, especially among group-living animals. 68 
Herein, we discuss why distinguishing the two processes is important, review the 69 
(few) attempts to quantify their relative prevalence, and make predictions about their 70 
distribution in nature. 71 
 72 
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT DISTINGUISHING 73 
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 A common assumption of research on reciprocity is that the only way actually 74 
to demonstrate reciprocity is to show the existence of a temporal contingency between 75 
the receipt of cooperation and the giving of cooperation (and/or between failure to 76 
receive cooperation and subsequent retaliation) (Hauser et al., 2003; Silk, 2003). This 77 
assumption implicitly equates reciprocity with partner control and, given the relative 78 
rarity of convincing examples of true temporal contingencies between giving and 79 
receiving cooperative acts, it leads to the conclusion that reciprocity must be rare (e.g. 80 
Stevens, Cushman & Hauser, 2005; see Cheney et al., 2010, and Olendorf, Getty & 81 
Scribner, 2004 for two examples of temporal contingencies studies). In fact, temporal 82 
contingencies between giving and receiving only test for partner control, and say 83 
nothing about partner choice (Carter, 2014). Thus, the emphasis on temporal 84 
contingencies, and the failure to note that they are predicted by partner control only, 85 
caused a widespread underestimation of the prevalence of reciprocity. 86 
 While empiricists focused on partner control (although apparently implying 87 
that the results apply to all forms of reciprocity), theoreticians began producing 88 
models of the evolution of cooperation by partner choice (Sherratt & Roberts, 1998; 89 
Aktipis, 2004; McNamara et al., 2008; Castro & Toro, 2010; Campennì & Schino, 90 
2014; see McNamara & Leimar, 2010 for a review on the role of variation in 91 
promoting the evolution of cooperation, especially by partner choice). It is now 92 
abundantly clear that partner choice can indeed promote the evolution of cooperation. 93 
Furthermore, theoretical models have shown that partner choice can also lead to 94 
patterns of reciprocal exchange similar to those observed in animals (see Section VII 95 
for details). Notwithstanding this new emphasis on partner choice, the contrast 96 
between the easiness with which cooperation evolves in a variety of partner-control 97 
models and the difficulties of showing empirical evidence for these models has led 98 
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some authors to hypothesize that proximate constraints may limit the evolvability of 99 
reciprocity (thus again implicitly extrapolating from partner control to all forms of 100 
reciprocity; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). 101 
 A corollary of the neglect of partner choice is that evidence that animals direct 102 
their cooperative acts preferentially to those individuals from which they receive most 103 
cooperation is dismissed as showing ‘only a correlation’ (Silk, 2013). Such evidence 104 
however is (in stark contrast to the limited evidence about temporal contingencies) 105 
truly overwhelming, so that we believe it should not be dismissed lightly. 106 
 107 
III. ACROSS-DYAD CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GIVING AND 108 
RECEIVING 109 
 One of the oldest ways of assessing the relations between giving and receiving 110 
cooperation is to carry out a correlation across dyads between cooperation given and 111 
cooperation received. Regardless of the statistical technique employed [matrix 112 
correlations or some variation of generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs)] these 113 
analyses enter dyadic values of cooperation given (i.e. cooperation given by each 114 
subject to each other subject) as the dependent variable and dyadic values of 115 
cooperation received as one of the independent variables. Kinship and/or other 116 
potential confounding factors are usually added as additional independent variables. 117 
Typically, dyadic values are calculated on the basis of a relatively long observation 118 
period (e.g. grooming rates averaged across several months of observation). 119 
 In addition to many empirical studies (e.g. Silk, 1992; Watts, 2002; Carne, 120 
Wiper & Semple, 2011), three meta-analyses have addressed the relationship between 121 
giving and receiving cooperative behaviour in primates. These meta-analyses 122 
summarized studies conducted on dozens of different primate species and hundreds of 123 
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different individuals. Schino (2007; also including a single temporal relations study) 124 
assessed the relationship between grooming and agonistic support; Schino & Aureli 125 
(2008) examined the relationship between giving and receiving grooming; Jaeggi & 126 
Gurven (2013; including data on humans) investigated the relationships between 127 
grooming and food sharing and between giving and receiving food. All three of these 128 
studies found significant positive weighted average correlations across dyads between 129 
giving and receiving cooperative acts. Overall, the results of these meta-analyses 130 
provide extremely robust and convincing evidence for reciprocal exchanges in 131 
primates. Note, however, that they are silent as to the underlying processes. 132 
 Across-dyad positive correlations between cooperation given and received are 133 
not limited to primates. Recent studies have broadened the phylogenetic scope of such 134 
analyses and have obtained similar results in several other species, including jackdaws 135 
(Corvus monedula) that exchange food and interchange food for allopreening (De 136 
Kort, Emery & Clayton, 2006), coatis (Nasua nasua) that exchange agonistic support 137 
(Romero & Aureli, 2008), spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta) that interchange 138 
communal defence at carcasses for tolerance while feeding (Smith, Memenis & 139 
Holekamp, 2007), rooks (Corvus frugileus) that exchange food and interchange food 140 
for allopreening and agonistic support (Scheid, Schmidt & Noë, 2008), ravens 141 
(Corvus corax) that exchange agonistic support and interchange allopreening for 142 
support (Fraser & Bugnyar, 2012), and vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) that 143 
exchange regurgitated blood and interchange blood for allogrooming (Carter & 144 
Wilkinson, 2013). 145 
 Overall, evidence that group-living animals (including humans) direct most of 146 
their cooperative acts towards those individuals from which they receive most 147 
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cooperative acts seems unassailable. It is clear that we need an interpretation for such 148 
a common phenomenon. 149 
 150 
IV. THE MEANING OF ACROSS-DYAD CORRELATIONS 151 
 We propose that across-dyad correlations between cooperative acts given and 152 
received are the result of the sum of the two separate processes of partner control and 153 
partner choice. Due to the nature of these dyadic data, no information is available on 154 
the temporal relationships between single cooperative events. In principle, it is 155 
possible to imagine two extremes of a continuum. At one end of the continuum, a 156 
significant positive dyadic correlation can result from a tight temporal relationship 157 
between giving and receiving (each act of giving is immediately returned). At the 158 
other end of the continuum, it can derive from interindividual preferences based on a 159 
comparison of the overall amount of cooperation received from each group member, 160 
in the complete absence of a temporal relationship between giving and receiving (see 161 
Section VII and Campennì & Schino, 2014, for a model showing that when partner 162 
choice is based on a comparison of the amount of cooperation received from group 163 
members, across-dyad correlations between cooperation given and received emerge). 164 
The first extreme of the continuum would correspond to strict partner control in the 165 
absence of partner choice; the other extreme would correspond to partner choice in 166 
the absence of partner control. As already noted, real animals probably use a mixture 167 
of the two strategies and the across-dyad correlations we observe empirically thus 168 
reflect the sum of these two processes. 169 
 It follows from the above reasoning that across-dyad correlations do provide 170 
evidence for reciprocity, but they do not tell us anything about the relative 171 
contributions of the two processes. The paucity of convincing evidence of partner 172 
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control together with the abundance of across-dyad correlations between cooperative 173 
acts given and received suggest that partner choice may be the prevalent process, but 174 
we have relatively little quantitative evidence from studies that compare the two 175 
processes. Below, we review this evidence. 176 
 177 
V. TRYING TO DISTINGUISH 178 
 A few studies have tried to estimate the relative contributions of partner 179 
control and partner choice in the same species and setting by evaluating both the 180 
temporal relationships between individual cooperative events and the across-dyad 181 
correlations between overall cooperation given and received. Schino, Ventura & 182 
Troisi (2003) and Schino, Polizzi di Sorrentino & Tiddi (2007) observed no short-183 
term temporal relations between giving and receiving grooming or between grooming 184 
and agonistic support in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata). At the same time, 185 
macaques showed strong positive across-dyad correlations between grooming given 186 
and received and between grooming and support. Tiddi et al. (2011) observed no 187 
short-term temporal relationship between grooming and tolerance over a clumped 188 
food resource coupled with strong across-dyad correlations in wild tufted capuchin 189 
monkeys (Cebus apella). Kaburu & Newton-Fisher (2015) observed no short-term 190 
exchange of grooming for sexual access together with a positive across-dyad 191 
relationship between male mating success and grooming by males to females in a 192 
community of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) characterized by egalitarian 193 
dominance relationships. Jaeggi, Stevens & Van Schaik (2010) and Jaeggi et al. 194 
(2013) observed no short-term temporal relationship between grooming and food 195 
sharing in chimpanzees, while long-term food sharing given was best predicted by 196 
food sharing received. In bonobos (Pan paniscus) food sharing increased the short-197 
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term exchange of grooming and was also, in the long-term, best predicted by 198 
relationship quality (Jaeggi et al., 2010, 2013). Finally, Carter & Wilkinson (2013) 199 
conducted a fasting experiment in vampire bats. They found that, within dyads, blood 200 
given in a particular trial was not predicted by blood received in the previous trial. At 201 
the same time, blood given was strongly correlated with blood received across dyads. 202 
 In all these studies (with the possible exception of the bonobo studies of 203 
Jaeggi et al. (2010, 2013) partner control appeared to exert weak or no effect on 204 
cooperative behaviours (see Table 1 for details regarding the time windows used to 205 
test for immediate reciprocation) and our interpretation is therefore that the positive 206 
across-dyad correlations have to be ascribed (almost) entirely to partner choice. 207 
 Other studies used refined statistical techniques to identify (and then remove) 208 
the effects of partner control. Schino, Di Giuseppe & Visalberghi (2009), Schino & 209 
Pellegrini (2009) and Campennì et al. (2015) used survival analysis to identify the 210 
time window over which having received grooming increased the probability of 211 
returning grooming to the same partner, thus obtaining an objective (i.e. data-driven) 212 
estimate of immediate reciprocation (Table 1). These studies revealed significant 213 
short-term temporal relationships between giving and receiving grooming (i.e. 214 
animals showed an increased probability of immediately returning grooming, 215 
compared to their baseline). However, only 7–35% of the grooming episodes were 216 
immediately reciprocated, showing that temporal relationships between events played 217 
a limited role in guiding animal decisions about cooperation. When all the cases of 218 
immediate reciprocation were excluded from analysis (thus removing any effect of 219 
partner control), across-dyad correlations remained significant, again showing an 220 
important effect of partner choice (Schino et al., 2009; Schino & Pellegrini, 2009; 221 
Campennì et al., 2015). Gomes & Boesch (2009) reported similar results on 222 
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exchanges of meat for sexual access in wild chimpanzees. Note also that, although it 223 
is obviously possible that an act of cooperation received can sometimes affect the 224 
likelihood of returning cooperation past the measured time window, this effect is 225 
likely to be small. It is clear that any partner-control effect of cooperation received 226 
must decrease monotonically with time, so that the magnitude of this effect after it is 227 
no longer operationally measurable must be negligible. 228 
 Applying new methods of network dynamics, Hooper et al. (2013) tested 229 
‘stationary’ (i.e. long-term) and ‘dynamic’ (i.e. short-term) reciprocity in the 230 
exchange of manioc beer among Tsimane horticulturalists. They found robust long-231 
term reciprocity, while short-term reciprocity only applied to socially distant partners. 232 
 Fruteau et al. (2011) found little evidence for two specific partner-control 233 
strategies (‘parcelling’ and ‘raise the stake’) in the grooming exchanges of wild 234 
mangabeys (Cercocebus atys) and vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops). Finally, 235 
Sabbatini et al. (2012) conducted a food-sharing experiment on tufted capuchin 236 
monkeys in which animals were tested in triads or in dyads. In triadic tests, partner 237 
choice exerted a stronger effect than partner control (effect sizes r=0.289 and r=0.194, 238 
respectively; unpublished data from Sabbatini et al. 2012). Interestingly, partner 239 
control appeared to play a reduced role in triadic compared to dyadic tests. This 240 
suggests a causal role for the possibility of partner choice in reducing the scope of 241 
partner control. Bshary & Grutter (2002) similarly reported that in a cleaner fish 242 
mutualism (Labroides dimidiatus with clients Ctenochaetus striatus), increased 243 
possibilities of partner choice were associated with reduced partner control. 244 
 Overall, the available evidence shows that partner choice is the prevailing 245 
process whenever both processes have been studied simultaneously. 246 
 247 
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VI. THE PROXIMATE MECHANISMS UNDERLYING RECIPROCITY 248 
 Before drawing conclusions from the evidence reviewed above, we will 249 
discuss briefly the proximate mechanisms underlying reciprocity. This topic is 250 
traditionally neglected; most authors that do discuss proximate mechanisms adopt 251 
(rather uncritically) the classification proposed by Brosnan & de Waal (2002). Below, 252 
we build on the work of Brosnan & de Waal (2002) and propose three hypothetical 253 
proximate mechanisms for reciprocity that overcome some of the difficulties 254 
encountered by their original formulation. Proximate mechanisms can be thought of 255 
as evolved answers to recurrent problems, and can therefore be expected to implement 256 
adaptive responses appropriate to the costs and benefits of the situation. The three 257 
mechanisms we discuss below are therefore likely to have evolved under different 258 
social and ecological conditions. 259 
 260 
(1) Hard-wired reciprocity 261 
 This mechanism replaces Brosnan & de Waal’s (2002) symmetry-based 262 
reciprocity that, in its original formulation, cannot be evolutionarily stable (M. 263 
Campennì & G. Schino, in preparation). Hard-wired reciprocity can be hypothesized 264 
to evolve whenever reciprocity is needed in one-shot interactions (i.e. interactions that 265 
are unlikely to be repeated). The animal responds ‘instinctively’ to the receipt of a 266 
cooperative act by immediately returning it. This mechanism is characterized by short 267 
delays between receiving and giving and by a one-to-one relationship in the 268 
currencies exchanged (one kind of cooperation is always exchanged with the same 269 
other kind of cooperation). It requires neither individual recognition, nor stable social 270 
relationships, and is likely to be found in cognitively unsophisticated animals (e.g. 271 
egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites; Fischer, 1980; Sella, 1985) or in animals 272 
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that do not form stable social groups [e.g. grooming in impalas (Aepyceros 273 
melampus); Connor, 1995]. It is inherently a partner-control mechanism, although, in 274 
a biological market perspective, it can be conceived to allow some flexibility in 275 
exchange rates in relation to the conditions of the market place. 276 
 277 
(2) Emotionally based reciprocity 278 
 To the extent that emotions can be conceived as task-specific computational 279 
mechanisms (LeDoux, 2012; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013), it is possible to hypothesize 280 
that a system of ‘emotional bookkeeping’ (Schino & Aureli, 2009) evolved to support 281 
reciprocity in group-living animals, i.e. under conditions of continuous social 282 
interaction with individually recognizable group mates. 283 
 Our formulation of emotionally based reciprocity is derived from Brosnan & 284 
de Waal's (2002) attitudinal reciprocity, but acts over a longer time frame. Through 285 
this mechanism, cooperation received triggers partner-specific positive emotions that 286 
promote subsequent cooperation. What motivates an animal to engage in emotionally 287 
based cooperation is the social attachment that it has developed with group 288 
companions (social attachment that itself depends also on the receipt of cooperative 289 
behaviours). Emotions thus constitute a bookkeeping system that can act over 290 
relatively long time frames and allow easy and flexible conversion among multiple 291 
currencies (Schino & Aureli, 2009). Emotionally based reciprocity requires the 292 
formation of differentiated social relationships that guide social decision-making, but 293 
no special cognitive abilities are otherwise needed. The formation of differential 294 
social relationships (from strong social bonds to simple cohabitation) is inherently a 295 
partner-choice mechanism that promotes outbidding competition (Campennì & 296 
Schino, 2014). In humans emotions associated with cooperative exchanges (e.g. anger 297 
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or gratitude) presumably play a role also as a partner-control mechanism (van't Wout 298 
et al., 2006; McCullough, Kimeldorf & Cohen, 2008). We know very little about the 299 
short-term emotional consequences of cooperation in animals. In primates, 300 
displacement activities have been proposed as a measure of anxiety-like emotions 301 
(Maestripieri et al., 1992; Schino et al., 1996) and used to gauge the emotional 302 
consequences of receiving grooming. Overall, rather inconsistent results have been 303 
obtained (Schino et al., 1988; Radford, 2012; Molesti & Majolo, 2013; Semple, 304 
Harrison & Lehmann, 2013). 305 
 306 
(3) Calculated reciprocity 307 
 Calculated reciprocity can be hypothesized to evolve as a response to the need 308 
to be able to engage in reciprocal exchanges in rare and or/novel situations and/or 309 
when interacting with unfamiliar individuals. Alternatively, it can be conceived as a 310 
by-product of selection for the general ability to plan future actions. 311 
 An animal that engages in calculated reciprocity is supposed to be motivated 312 
by the expectation of a future return benefit (the reciprocated cooperation). Calculated 313 
reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities such as the capacity to plan 314 
social interactions or some form of ‘future thinking’. Note that, unlike Brosnan & de 315 
Waal's (2002) original formulation, we propose the defining characteristic of 316 
calculated reciprocity should not be the reliance on some computation of costs and 317 
benefits but the role played by expected benefits as the key motivating factor. This 318 
also allows calculated reciprocity to be empirically distinguished from emotionally 319 
based reciprocity (Schino & Pellegrini, 2011). Calculated reciprocity is likely to be 320 
rare outside humans (see Section VIII). It can in principle underlie both partner-321 
control and partner-choice processes. 322 
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VII. MODELLING RECIPROCITY IN GROUP-LIVING ANIMALS 324 
 Most theoretical studies of cooperation and reciprocity focus on modelling 325 
their evolution rather than on attempting to reproduce existing patterns of exchanges 326 
of cooperative acts as observed in group-living animals (see Section II for partner-327 
choice models and Bshary & Bronstein, 2011, for a review and classification of 328 
partner-control models). A few recent theoretical studies have used agent-based 329 
simulations to model and reproduce empirically observed patterns of social 330 
interactions. In these models, artificial agents (that may or may not be set in space) 331 
exchange positive or negative interactions based on their past experiences and/or on 332 
their spatial proximity with other agents. These models may be relevant for 333 
understanding the proximate mechanisms underlying reciprocity and its emergence 334 
from animal decision rules. 335 
 Puga-Gonzalez, Hildenbrandt & Hemelrijk (2009) and Puga-Gonzalez, 336 
Hoscheid & Hemelrijk (2015) have shown that across-dyad correlations between 337 
cooperative acts given and received can emerge as a consequence of the spatial 338 
structuring of agents. When ‘social bonds’ (in the form of a tendency to follow 339 
specific individuals) were added to these models, the pattern of reciprocity 340 
strengthened. Evers et al. (2014, 2015) modelled the emotional consequences of 341 
affiliation and fear, and showed that individual-specific emotional states can generate 342 
patterns of reciprocity consistent with a mechanism of emotional bookkeeping. 343 
 Although the aim of these models was only to reproduce existing patterns of 344 
reciprocal cooperation in animals, one could argue for the necessity to test also 345 
whether the strategies implemented in the agents were evolutionarily robust, i.e. if 346 
they competed successfully against other (notably, selfish) strategies. M. Campennì & 347 
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G. Schino (in preparation) found that when cooperative acts are based on 348 
interindividual proximity, reciprocal patterns of exchange emerge (thus confirming 349 
the results of Puga-Gonzalez et al., 2015). Nevertheless, such a strategy was 350 
unsuccessful in an evolutionary test in which it had to compete against selfish agents 351 
that never cooperated. Generally speaking, any strategy that does not include a 352 
mechanism that controls or excludes cheaters is likely to be evolutionarily 353 
unsuccessful. 354 
 Campennì & Schino (2014) implemented the same strategy of partner choice 355 
based on benefits received in both a ‘single-generation’ and an evolutionary model. In 356 
their model, agents choose to cooperate with those partners from which they had 357 
received the most cooperation. They showed that a strategy of pure partner choice can 358 
both reproduce emergent patterns of reciprocal exchange (i.e. across-dyads 359 
correlations) and compete successfully against selfish agents in an evolutionary test. 360 
Note that in this model agents were obligate cooperators, and there was therefore no 361 
possibility of partner control. This study provided theoretical (simulation-based) 362 
support for a role of partner choice in the evolution and maintenance of reciprocal 363 
cooperation in group-living animals. 364 
 Agent-based models appear to be a promising tool for understanding the 365 
emergence of reciprocity, but they need to incorporate both tests aimed at reproducing 366 
existing patterns of behaviour as observed in real animals and tests aimed at 367 
evaluating the evolutionary plausibility of the implemented strategies. 368 
 369 
VIII. INFERENCES AND PREDICTIONS 370 
 Two inferences can be drawn tentatively from the available evidence. First, if 371 
one accepts that across-dyad correlations between cooperative acts given and received 372 
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do provide useful insight, then one must conclude that reciprocity is indeed common, 373 
at least in group-living animals. This is in sharp contrast to some commonly held 374 
opinions (Stevens et al., 2005, Clutton-Brock, 2009). Second, partner choice seems to 375 
play a larger role than partner control in guiding animal decisions about cooperation. 376 
This is again in contrast to common (often implicit) assumptions. 377 
 Our focus herein is on the second of these conclusions, and thus we should ask 378 
the following questions: is this to be considered a conclusion of general applicability 379 
or is it in some way taxonomically restricted? Are there conditions or animal taxa 380 
where partner control can instead be expected to prevail? 381 
 Noë & Voelkl (2013) suggested that partner choice should prevail in one-shot 382 
interactions, while when animals engage in longer-term relationships progressively 383 
larger amounts of partner control should become apparent. We note, however, that in 384 
group-living animals (that are likely to have long-lasting relationships) the costs of 385 
partner sampling and partner switching are greatly reduced, a factor that should 386 
favour partner choice and thus promote cooperation through outbidding competition 387 
(Johnstone & Bshary, 2008). Also, stable social relationships facilitate emotionally 388 
based reciprocity that, in turn, makes partner choice an easy option for a variety of 389 
animals. 390 
 With a single exception (Carter & Wilkinson, 2013), all studies that tried to 391 
compare partner control and partner choice in the same species and setting have been 392 
conducted on primates, most concluding that partner choice is the prevalent process 393 
(see Section V). Thus, there is an urgent need for similar studies in other taxa. Group-394 
living primate and non-primate species share two important aspects that make us 395 
suggest that partner choice may be the prevalent process across taxa. First, positive 396 
across-dyad correlations between cooperative acts given and received are common in 397 
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various taxa (Section III). Second, long-term social bonds have important fitness 398 
consequences in group-living primate and non-primate species (Silk, 2007; Silk et al., 399 
2010; Cameron, Setsaas & Linklater, 2009; Frère et al., 2010), suggesting that the 400 
formation of differentiated social relationships has been subject to positive selection 401 
in a variety of taxa. Long-term differentiated social relationships and emotionally 402 
based reciprocity are closely linked, and similar mechanisms of emotionally based 403 
partner choice may have been favoured by natural selection whenever animals 404 
capable of interindividual recognition came to live in permanent groups (Schino & 405 
Aureli, 2009). 406 
 By contrast, animals that do not form long-term social relationships must 407 
necessarily rely on hard-wired reciprocity for their cooperative exchanges. Under 408 
these conditions, short-term reciprocation based on partner-control processes is likely 409 
to be the prevalent process, unless it is possible and inexpensive to ‘sample’ different 410 
potential partners before the actual cooperative exchange takes place. 411 
 We offer two possible explanations for why partner control is comparatively 412 
rare among group-living animals, both based on an assessment of the proximate 413 
mechanisms likely to underlie reciprocity. The first explanation is that partner control 414 
may require immediate reciprocation and thus be limited in scope. Stevens & Hauser 415 
(2004) identified several possible cognitive constraints (limited memory, limited 416 
computational ability, temporal discounting) that may limit the ability of animals to 417 
engage in reciprocal cooperation. We have argued elsewhere (Schino & Aureli, 2009; 418 
see also Carter, 2014) that these proximate constraints can be easily sidestepped by a 419 
proximate mechanism based on emotional bookkeeping. Emotional bookkeeping, 420 
however, is essentially a partner-choice mechanism, and the only way to overcome 421 
the cognitive constraints identified by Stevens & Hauser (2004) in a partner-control 422 
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process would be for reciprocity to be always immediate (possibly through hard-wired 423 
reciprocity). 424 
 Although immediate reciprocation does exist (e.g. immediate grooming 425 
reciprocity in primates; Barrett et al., 1999), its scope is clearly limited to those cases 426 
in which the exchanged currencies are simultaneously available and needed. For 427 
example, exchanges of grooming and agonistic support can only occur when support 428 
is needed, so that a tight temporal relationship reduces dramatically the possibility of 429 
exchange. Accordingly, reciprocal exchanges of grooming and support appear to 430 
occur on a much longer time frame that involves partner choice based on overall 431 
grooming/support received rather than short-term temporal relationships between 432 
events (Schino et al., 2007). 433 
 The second explanation for why partner control is relatively rare among 434 
group-living animals is that partner control may alternatively require some form of 435 
‘planning’ of social interactions and thus be taxonomically restricted to species with 436 
advanced cognitive capacities. Partner control may occur when cooperation is 437 
proximately motivated by the expectation of a return benefit (i.e. calculated 438 
reciprocity). We are aware of only a few studies of non-human animals whose results 439 
can be interpreted as a test of calculated reciprocity (as defined above). Dufour et al. 440 
(2009) reported that a single pair of orang-utan (Pongo pygmaeus) exchanged tokens 441 
that were valuable only for the partner showing turn taking and signalling. This 442 
suggested giving was associated with the expectation that the partner returned the 443 
favour. Pelé et al. (2009) tested a larger number of apes in a similar setting, and did 444 
not observe systematic exchanges that could be interpreted as motivated by the 445 
expectation of a return benefit. Similarly, Pelé et al. (2010) did not observe systematic 446 
exchanges of tokens in tufted capuchin monkeys or Tonkean macaques (Macaca 447 
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tonkeana). In a more naturalistic study, Schino & Pellegrini (2011) showed that 448 
female mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx) did not groom the alpha male immediately 449 
before attacking another group member (even if the male was more likely to provide 450 
support immediately after grooming), thus suggesting that the expectation to receive 451 
support did not motivate the females to groom the male. Interestingly, Sebastian-452 
Enesco & Warneken (2015) recently showed that 5-year-old, but not 3-year-old 453 
children adjusted their sharing of a toy in anticipation of future reciprocation, thus 454 
highlighting the late development of calculated reciprocity (see also House et al., 455 
2013, for comparable results on the development of contingent reciprocity). They also 456 
suggested that the mechanisms necessary for partner choice may develop in children 457 
earlier than those necessary for partner control. Overall, we argue that partner control 458 
may be relatively rare because it is restricted either in scope (being limited to those 459 
cases where immediate reciprocation is possible) or taxonomically (being limited to 460 
humans and possibly a few other species capable of calculated reciprocity). 461 
 462 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 463 
(1) Distinguishing between partner-control and partner-choice processes allows a 464 
better understanding of the importance of reciprocal cooperation in animals. The 465 
available evidence seems to suggest that partner choice is the prevalent process 466 
underlying reciprocity in group-living animals. This conclusion, however, is drawn 467 
from a taxonomically biased sample of observational studies including almost only 468 
nonhuman primates. 469 
(2) Three priorities emerge for future research. First, we need studies that quantify 470 
simultaneously partner control and partner choice in a broader variety of taxa, in order 471 
to assess the generality of our conclusions. Second, we need studies that 472 
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experimentally manipulate the occurrence of reciprocation in order to assess if and 473 
how this manipulation differentially affects parter control and partner choice. Third, 474 
we need studies that experimentally manipulate the possibility of partner control and 475 
partner choice in order to assess how one process is affected by the presence/absence 476 
of the other. Fulfilling these three needs will require the joint effort of researchers 477 
with disparate backgrounds and expertise. 478 
 479 
X. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 480 
 Writing of this paper was facilitated by I010/152/2014 C-133/2014 grant from 481 
the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT). 482 
 483 
XI. REFERENCES 484 
AKTIPIS, C. A. (2004). Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the 485 
evolution of cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 231, 249–260. 486 
AXELROD, R. & HAMILTON, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 487 
1390–1396. 488 
BARRETT, L., HENZI, S. P., WEINGRILL, T., LYCETT, J. E. & HILL, R. A. (1999). Market 489 
forces predict grooming reciprocity in female baboons. Proceedings of the 490 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 266, 665–670. 491 
BROSNAN, S. F. & DE WAAL, F. B. M. (2002). A proximate perspective on reciprocal 492 
altruism. Human Nature 13, 129–152. 493 
BSHARY, R. & BRONSTEIN, J. L. (2011). A general scheme to predict partner control 494 
mechanisms in pairwise cooperative interactions between unrelated individuals. 495 
Ethology 11, 271–283. 496 
 21 
BSHARY, R. & GRUTTER, A. S. (2002). Asymmetric cheating opportunities and partner 497 
control in a cleaner fish mutualism. Animal Behaviour 63, 547–555. 498 
BULL, J. J. & RICE, W. R. (1991). Distinguishing mechanisms for the evolution of 499 
cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 149, 63–74. 500 
CAMERON, E. Z., SETSAAS, T. H. & LINKLATER, W. L. (2009). Social bonds between 501 
unrelated females increase reproductive success in feral horses. Proceedings of 502 
the National Academy of Sciences 106, 13850–13853. 503 
CAMPENNÌ, M., MANCIOCCO, A., VITALE, A. & SCHINO, G. (2015). Exchanging 504 
grooming, but not tolerance and aggression in common marmosets (Callithrix 505 
jacchus). American Journal of Primatology 77, 222–228. 506 
CAMPENNÌ, M. & SCHINO, G. (2014). Partner choice promotes cooperation: the two 507 
faces of testing with agent-based models. Journal of Theoretical Biology 344, 508 
49–55. 509 
CARNE, C., WIPER, S. & SEMPLE, S. (2011). Reciprocation and interchange of 510 
grooming, agonistic support, feeding tolerance, and aggression in semi-free-511 
ranging Barbary macaques. American Journal of Primatology 73, 1127–1133. 512 
CARTER, G. G. (2014). The reciprocity controversy. Animal Behavior and Cognition 513 
1, 368–386. 514 
CARTER, G. G. & WILKINSON, G. S. (2013). Food sharing in vampire bats: reciprocal 515 
help predicts donations more than relatedness or harassment. Proceedings of the 516 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, 20122573. 517 
CASTRO, L. & TORO, M. A. (2010). To be or not to be a good social partner? Theory in 518 
Biosciences 129, 71–75. 519 
 22 
CHENEY, D. L., MOSCOVICE, L. R., HEESEN, M., MUNDRY, R. & SEYFARTH, R. M. 520 
(2010). Contingent cooperation between wild female baboons. Proceedings of 521 
the National Academy of Sciences 107, 9562–9566. 522 
CLUTTON-BROCK, T. H. (2009). Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. 523 
Nature 462, 51–57. 524 
CONNOR, R. C. (1995). Impala allogrooming and the parcelling model of reciprocity. 525 
Animal Behaviour 49, 528–530. 526 
COSMIDES, L. & TOOBY, J. (2013). Evolutionary psychology: new perspectives on 527 
cognition and motivation. Annual Review of Psychology 64, 201–229. 528 
DE KORT, S., EMERY, N.J. & CLAYTON, N.S. (2006). Food sharing in jackdaws, 529 
Corvus monedula: what, why and with whom? Animal Behaviour 72, 297–304. 530 
DUFOUR, V., PELÉ, M., NEUMANN, M., THIERRY, B. & CALL, J. (2009). Calculated 531 
reciprocity after all: computation behind token transfers in orang-utans. Biology 532 
Letters 5, 172–175. 533 
ESHEL, I. & CAVALLI-SFORZA, L. L. (1982). Assortment of encounters and evolution 534 
of cooperativeness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 79, 1331–535 
1335. 536 
EVERS, E., DE VRIES, H., SPRUIJT, B. M. & STERCK, E. H. M. (2014). The EMO-model: 537 
an agent-based model of primate social behaviour regulated by two emotional 538 
dimensions, anxiety-FEAR and satisfaction-LIKE. PLoS One 9, e87955. 539 
EVERS, E., DE VRIES, H., SPRUIJT, B. M. & STERCK, E. H. M. (2015). Emotional 540 
bookkeeping and high partner selectivity are necessary for the emergence of 541 
partner-specific reciprocal affiliation in an agent-based model of primate 542 
groups. PLoS One 10, e0118921. 543 
 23 
FISCHER, E. A. (1980). The relationship between mating system and simultaneous 544 
hermaphroditism in the coral reef fish, Hypoplectrus nigricans (Serranidae). 545 
Animal Behaviour 28, 620–633. 546 
FRASER, O. N. & BUGNYAR, T. (2012). Reciprocity of agonistic support in ravens. 547 
Animal Behaviour 83, 171–177. 548 
FRÈRE, C. H., KRÜTZEN, M., MANN, J.,  CONNOR, R. C., BEJDER, L. & SHERWIN, W. B. 549 
(2010). Social and genetic interactions drive fitness variation in a free-living 550 
dolphin population. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 551 
19949–19954. 552 
FRUTEAU, C., LEMOINE, S., HELLARD, E., VAN DAMME, E. & NOË, R. (2011). When 553 
females trade grooming for grooming: testing partner control and partner choice 554 
models of cooperation in two primate species. Animal Behaviour 81, 1223–555 
1230. 556 
FRUTEAU, C., VOELKL, B., VAN DAMME, E. & NOË, R. (2009). Supply and demand 557 
determine the market value of food providers in wild vervet monkeys. 558 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, 12007–12012. 559 
GOMES, C. M. & BOESCH, C. (2009). Wild chimpanzees exchange meat for sex on a 560 
long-term basis. PLoS One 4, e5116. 561 
HAUSER, M. D., CHEN, M. K., CHEN, F. & CHUANG, E. (2003). Give unto others: 562 
genetically unrelated cotton-top tamarin monkeys preferentially give food to 563 
those who altruistically give food back. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 564 
Biological Sciences 270, 2363–2370. 565 
HENZI, S. P. & BARRETT, L. (2002). Infants as a commodity in a baboon market. 566 
Animal Behaviour 63, 915–921. 567 
 24 
HOOPER, P. L., DEDEO, S., CALDWELL HOOPER, A. E., GURVEN, M. & KAPLAN, H. S. 568 
(2013). Dynamical structure of a traditional Amazonian social network. Entropy 569 
15, 4932–4955. 570 
HOUSE, B. R., HENRICH, J., SARNECKA, B. & SILK, J. B. (2013). The development of 571 
contingent reciprocity in children. Evolution and Human Behavior 34, 86–93. 572 
JAEGGI, A. V, DE GROOT, E., STEVENS, J. M. G. & VAN SCHAIK, C. P. (2013). 573 
Mechanisms of reciprocity in primates: testing for short-term contingency of 574 
grooming and food sharing in bonobos and chimpanzees. Evolution and Human 575 
Behavior 34, 69–77. 576 
JAEGGI, A. V & GURVEN, M. (2013). Reciprocity explains food sharing in humans and 577 
other primates independent of kin selection and tolerated scrounging: a 578 
phylogenetic meta-analysis. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 579 
Sciences 280, 20131615. 580 
JAEGGI, A. V, STEVENS, J. M. G. & VAN SCHAIK, C. P. (2010). Tolerant food sharing 581 
and reciprocity is precluded by despotism among bonobos but not chimpanzees. 582 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology 143, 41–51. 583 
JOHNSTONE, R. A. & BSHARY, R. (2008). Mutualism, market effects and partner 584 
control. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21, 879–88. 585 
LEDOUX, J. (2012). Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 73, 653–676. 586 
KABURU, S. S. K. & NEWTON-FISHER, N. E. (2015). Trading or coercion? Variation in 587 
male mating strategies between two communities of East African chimpanzees. 588 
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 69, 1039–1052. 589 
MAESTRIPIERI, D., SCHINO, G., AURELI, F. & TROISI, A. (1992). A modest proposal: 590 
displacement activities as an indicator of emotions in primates. Animal 591 
Behaviour 44, 967–979. 592 
 25 
MCCULLOUGH, M. E., KIMELDORF, M. B. & COHEN, A. D. (2008). An adaptation for 593 
altruism? The social causes, social effects, and social evolution of gratitude. 594 
Current Directions in Psychological Science 17, 281–285. 595 
MCNAMARA, J. M., BARTA, Z., FROMHAGE, L. & HOUSTON, A. I. (2008). The 596 
coevolution of choosiness and cooperation. Nature 451, 189–192. 597 
MCNAMARA, J. M. & LEIMAR, O. (2010). Variation and the response to variation as a 598 
basis for successful cooperation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 599 
Society B: Biological Sciences 365, 2627–2633. 600 
MOLESTI, S. & MAJOLO, B. (2013). Grooming increases self-directed behaviour in 601 
wild Barbary macaques, Macaca sylvanus. Animal Behaviour 86, 169–175. 602 
NOË, R. (2006). Cooperation experiments: coordination through communication 603 
versus acting apart together. Animal Behaviour 71, 1–18. 604 
NOË, R. & HAMMERSTEIN, P. (1994). Biological markets: supply and demand 605 
determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating. 606 
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 35, 1–11. 607 
NOË, R. & HAMMERSTEIN, P. (1995). Biological markets. Trends in Ecology and 608 
Evolution 10, 336–339. 609 
NOË, R. & VOELKL, B. (2013). Cooperation and biological markets: the power of 610 
partner choice. In Cooperation and Its Evolution (Sterelny, K., Joyce, R., 611 
Calcott, B. & Fraser, B., eds), pp. 131–152, MIT Press. 612 
OLENDORF, R., GETTY, T. & SCRIBNER, K. (2004). Cooperative nest defence in red-613 
winged blackbirds: reciprocal altruism, kinship or by-product mutualism? 614 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 271, 177–182. 615 
PELÉ, M., DUFOUR, V., THIERRY, B. & CALL, J. (2009). Token transfers among great 616 
apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Pan troglodytes): 617 
 26 
species differences, gestural requests, and reciprocal exchange. Journal of 618 
Comparative Psychology 123, 375–84. 619 
PELÉ, M., THIERRY, B., CALL, J. & DUFOUR, V. (2010). Monkeys fail to reciprocate in 620 
an exchange task. Animal Cognition 13, 745–751. 621 
PUGA-GONZALEZ, I., HILDENBRANDT, H. & HEMELRIJK, C. K. (2009). Emergent 622 
patterns of social affiliation in primates, a model. PLoS Computational Biology 623 
5, e1000630. 624 
PUGA-GONZALEZ, I., HOSCHEID, A. & HEMELRIJK, C. K. (2015). Friendship, 625 
reciprocation, and interchange in an individual-based model. Behavioral 626 
Ecology and Sociobiology 69, 383–394. 627 
RADFORD, A. N. (2012). Post-allogrooming reductions in self-directed behaviour are 628 
affected by role and status in the green woodhoopoe. Biology Letters 8, 24–27. 629 
ROMERO, T. & AURELI, F. (2008). Reciprocity of support in coatis (Nasua nasua). 630 
Journal of Comparative Psychology 122, 19–25. 631 
SABBATINI, G., DE BORTOLI VIZIOLI, A., VISALBERGHI, E. & SCHINO, G. (2012). Food 632 
transfers in capuchin monkeys: an experiment on partner choice. Biology Letters 633 
8, 757–759. 634 
SCHEID, C., SCHMIDT, J. & NOË, R. (2008). Distinct patterns of food offering and co-635 
feeding in rooks. Animal Behaviour 76, 1701–1707. 636 
SCHINO, G. (2007). Grooming and agonistic support: a meta-analysis of primate 637 
reciprocal altruism. Behavioral Ecology 18, 115–120. 638 
SCHINO, G. & AURELI, F. (2008). Grooming reciprocation among female primates: a 639 
meta-analysis. Biology Letters 4, 9–11. 640 
SCHINO, G. & AURELI, F. (2009). Reciprocal altruism in primates: partner choice, 641 
cognition, and emotions. Advances in the Study of Behavior 39, 45–69. 642 
 27 
SCHINO, G., DI GIUSEPPE, F. & VISALBERGHI, E. (2009). The time frame of partner 643 
choice in the grooming reciprocation of Cebus apella. Ethology 115, 70–76. 644 
SCHINO, G. & PELLEGRINI, B. (2009). Grooming in mandrills and the time frame of 645 
reciprocal partner choice. American Journal of Primatology 71, 884–888. 646 
SCHINO, G. & PELLEGRINI, B. (2011). Grooming and the expectation of reciprocation 647 
in mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx). International Journal of Primatology 32, 406–648 
414. 649 
SCHINO, G., PERRETTA, G., TAGLIONI, A. M. & TROISI, A. (1996). Primate 650 
displacement activities as an ethopharmacological model of anxiety. Anxiety 2, 651 
186–191. 652 
SCHINO, G., POLIZZI DI SORRENTINO, E. & TIDDI, B. (2007). Grooming and coalitions 653 
in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata): partner choice and the time frame of 654 
reciprocation. Journal of Comparative Psychology 121, 181–188. 655 
SCHINO, G., SCUCCHI, S., MAESTRIPIERI, D. & TURILLAZZI, P. G. (1988). 656 
Allogrooming as a tension reduction mechanism: a behavioral approach. 657 
American Journal of Primatology 16, 43–50. 658 
SCHINO, G., VENTURA, R. & TROISI, A. (2003). Grooming among female Japanese 659 
macaques: distinguishing between reciprocation and interchange. Behavioral 660 
Ecology 14, 887–891. 661 
SEBASTIÁN-ENESCO, C. & WARNEKEN, F. (2015). The shadow of the future: 5-year-662 
olds, but not 3-year-olds, adjust their sharing in anticipation of reciprocation. 663 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 129, 40–54. 664 
SELLA, G. (1985). Reciprocal egg trading and brood care in a hermaphroditic 665 
polychaete worm. Animal Behaviour 33, 938–944. 666 
 28 
SEMPLE, S., HARRISON, C. & LEHMANN, J. (2013). Grooming and anxiety in Barbary 667 
macaques. Ethology 119, 779–785. 668 
SHERRATT, T. N. & ROBERTS, G. (1998). The evolution of generosity and choosiness 669 
in cooperative exchanges. Journal of Theoretical Biology 193, 167–77. 670 
SILK, J. B. (1992). The patterning of intervention among male bonnet macaques: 671 
reciprocity, revenge, and loyalty. Current Anthropology 33, 318–325. 672 
SILK, J. B. (2003). Cooperation without counting: the puzzle of friendship. In Genetic 673 
and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (Hammerstein, P., ed), pp. 37–54, MIT 674 
Press. 675 
SILK, J. B. (2007). The adaptive value of sociality in mammalian groups. 676 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences 362, 539–677 
559. 678 
SILK, J. B. (2013). Reciprocal altruism. Current Biology 23, R827–R828. 679 
SILK, J. B., BEEHNER, J. C., BERGMAN, T. J., CROCKFORD, C., ENGH, A. L., 680 
MOSCOVICE, L. R., WITTIG, R. M., SEYFARTH, R. M. & CHENEY, D. L. (2010). 681 
Strong and consistent social bonds enhance the longevity of female baboons. 682 
Current Biology 20, 1359–1361. 683 
SMITH, J. E., MEMENIS, S. K. & HOLEKAMP, K. E. (2007). Rank-related partner choice 684 
in the fission-fusion society of the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta). Behavioral 685 
Ecology and Sociobiology 61, 753–765. 686 
STEVENS, J. R., CUSHMAN, F. & HAUSER, M. D. (2005). Evolving the psychological 687 
mechanisms for cooperation. Annual Review of Ecology Evolution and 688 
Systematics 36, 499–518. 689 
STEVENS, J. R. & HAUSER, M. D. (2004). Why be nice? Psychological constraints on 690 
the evolution of cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8, 60–65. 691 
 29 
TIDDI, B., AURELI, F., POLIZZI DI SORRENTINO, E., JANSON, C.H. & SCHINO, G. (2011). 692 
Grooming for tolerance? Two mechanisms of exchange in wild tufted capuchin 693 
monkeys. Behavioral Ecology 22, 663–669. 694 
VAN’T WOUT, M., KAHN, R. S., SANFEY, A. G. & ALEMAN, A. (2006). Affective state 695 
and decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Experimental Brain Research 696 
169, 564–568. 697 
WATTS, D. P. (2002). Reciprocity and interchange in the social relationships of wild 698 
male chimpanzees. Behaviour 139, 343–370. 699 
 700 
 30 
Table 1. Assumed and measured time windows for immediate reciprocation in studies of reciprocity. 
 
Species Assumed/measured Duration Reference 
Cebus apella Assumed About 1 min Sabbatini et al. (2012) 
Cebus nigritus Assumed 2 h Tiddi et al. (2011) 
Cecrocebus atys and 
Chlorocebus aethiops 
Assumed 30 and 20 s, respectively Fruteau et al. (2011) 
Desmodus rotundus Assumed Unclear (about 2 weeks) Carter & Wilkinson (2013) 
Macaca fuscata Assumed 1 min Schino et al. (2003) 
Macaca fuscata Assumed 30 min Schino et al. (2007) 
Pan paniscus and P. 
troglodytes 
Assumed 1 h Jaeggi et al. (2013) 
Pan troglodytes Assumed 30 s Kaburu & Newton-Fisher (2015) 
Callithrix jaccus Measured 2 min Campennì et al. (2015) 
Cebus apella Measured 7 min Schino et al. (2009) 
Homo sapiens Measured 3 days Hooper et al. (2013) 
Mandrillus sphinx Measured 4.5 min Schino & Pellegrini (2009) 
 
